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1 Introduction
Consider a meeting of the executive board of a business where a decision by voting is due
on to which of two foreign markets to expand. All members of the executive board have
the same target, to increase the profits of the business, yet they may have different opinions
about which market will be best for their company. Assume all board members have access
to a report detailing which market is likely to be the most profitable one. On top of that,
board members may have their own private information based on their past experience, their
discussions with other colleagues, etc. The question we ask in this paper is this twofold:
can it be rational for board members to ignore their private information and vote following
the report even when private information is informative and abstention is allowed? Will the
committee arrive at the best possible decision given the information they have available?
To answer these questions we consider a common value election between two candidates
where voters are not perfectly informed about who is the best candidate. Instead, each voter
receives information about the identity of the best candidate from two sources, one public
and one private. The public source of information is a common prior shared by all voters.
The private source of information consists of an idiosyncratic signal of a certain quality,
which could for example reflect the voter’s expertise. Each voter knows the quality of his
own signal but not the quality of the signals others receive nor these signals themselves. In
this setting it may happen that some voters decide to abstain because they believe that their
vote is going to harm the chances of the best candidate winning the election. This is known
as strategic abstention (see for instance McMurray (2010, 2013); Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996)), which can occur if the signal quality of these voters is low, so that they prefer leaving
the decision of selecting a candidate to other, possibly better informed, voters (self-selected
experts). In this paper we ask under which conditions a voter may even vote against his signal
and what are the implications of such behaviour for efficiency and information aggregation.
From our theoretical analysis we obtain three main results: first, we find that a significant
amount of voting against the signal can be observed in equilibrium. Voting against the signal
can be rational if the voter deems the signal of too low quality compared to the information
contained in the asymmetric (and hence informative) prior. Second, we find that voting does
not generally aggregate information efficiently. This is due to a mis-coordination problem
that appears as a result of equilibrium multiplicity. Third, for elections with a large number
of voters we prove that the effect of an asymmetric common prior vanishes to zero and the
election resembles one where the common prior is non-informative.
Our analysis is closely related to McMurray (2013), who studies Condorcet (1785)’s classic
common value environment with symmetric priors. The main difference between McMurray
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(2013) and the present paper is that we allow for the common prior to be asymmetric: i.e. not
all candidates are equally likely to be the best one a priori. This gives rise to a phenomenon
not present in McMurray (2013): voters can vote against their own signal. With symmetric
priors any signal is at least as good as the prior in predicting the best candidate. This
means that no voter has incentives to vote against his signal and their decision then reduces
to whether to abstain or not. In our paper the fact that a signal may be less informative
than the common prior means that some voters will choose to vote against their private
signal. Contrary to previous literature, voting against the private signal is not the result of
the different biases voters may have (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996; Rivas and Rodr´ıguez-
A´lvarez, 2012).
Our experiments test both the predictions of the symmetric case studied in McMurray
(2013) as well as the predictions of the asymmetric case introduced here for small elections.
As expected from the theoretical analysis, few voters (< 10%) vote against their signal with
uninformative (symmetric) priors, but 40 − 80%, depending on signal accuracy, do so in
the case with informative (asymmetric) priors. Turnout is higher in the asymmetric case
(83−86%) than in the symmetric case (78%) and slightly higher than theoretically expected.
The experiments deliver a surprising result in terms of efficiency. While as expected more
informative priors lead to higher efficiency, more informative signals do not. This is because in
the experiments voters trust moderately precise signals too much, which leads to an inefficient
use of information. A consequence of this, efficiency is higher with less informative signals.
Our research contributes to the literature on common value elections and strategic ab-
stention. The classic paper of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) raised serious questions about
Condorcet’s implicit assumption that all voters will vote naively, i.e. vote as if they were the
only voter. They showed that voting against the signal can arise if abstention is not allowed
and all voters have the same signal quality. In Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) voters are
of three types: partisans, fully informed and uninformed. Partisans support a certain can-
didate irrespective of the information available while fully informed and uninformed voters
prefer the best candidate. Fully informed voters know for certain who is the best candidate
while uninformed voters have no information about the best candidate other than the com-
mon prior. They show that a positive fraction of uninformed voters abstain even when they
strictly prefer one candidate over the other (swingers voter’s curse). Battaglini et al. (2010)
experimentally tested this model and found results in terms of efficiency, turnout and the
margin of victory that are in line with theory. We find theoretically and experimentally that
being uninformed is not a requirement for the swingers voter’s curse (see also McMurray
(2013)). Indeed, the fact that voters posses information of different qualities leads to a self
selection in abstention; those with lower quality signals abstain, even if their signal is more
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informative than the prior, and even if based on the information they have they strictly prefer
one candidate over the other.
In Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) voters receive information from different sources,
where each source may provide information of different qualities. However, they do not allow
for abstention, which is a crucial difference to our model. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)
allow voters to abstain. However, all voters receive information of the same quality. The
results in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) are similar to ours except for the fact that in
their article the reason behind what each voter chooses given his signal is how biased towards
either candidate he is. In our paper, no voter is biased and the driving force behind what
each voter chooses given his signal is the quality of the signal. Our paper hence identifies
a new mechanism of why voting behaviour can differ across players: differences in behavior
might be due either to differences in preferences, as in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), or
due to differences in the perceived quality of the information, as in our case.
Also related are Ben-Yashar and Milchtaich (2007) who study voters with homogeneous
preferences and private signals of different qualities. However, they do not consider the
possibility of abstention; their focus is on computing the best monotone voting rule. Krishna
and Morgan (2012) investigate the welfare effects of introducing voluntary voting when all
voters have the same signal quality. Oliveros (2013) presents a model where voters can buy
information of different qualities and studies the effects of different ideologies on information
acquisition.
A technical difference between our paper and some of the previous theoretical literature
(McMurray (2013), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997, 1999) among others) is that we
do not consider an uncertain number of voters, i.e. Poisson games (Myerson, 1998), to prove
our results. In elections with a small number of voters, as it is the case in the example in
our starting paragraph, this assumption may seem hard to justify. The fact that we do not
consider Poisson games does not lead to different results when the number of voters is large.
In this case, our results mirror those of McMurray (2013).
Finally, our research also contributes to the experimental literature on the Condorcet Jury
paradigm. The first published experiment on behaviour in voting games was conducted by
Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) who base their experiment on Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)’s
analysis of strategic voting with the unanimity rule. Closer to our setting are Battaglini et al.
(2008) and Battaglini et al. (2010) as described above, and also Morton and Tyran (2011)
who extend the Battaglini et al. (2008) setting by exploring an environment where poorly
informed voters are not completely uninformed - they simply receive lower quality signals.
This can lead to equilibria where all voters vote and to equilibria where the poorly informed
voters abstain. However, as priors are symmetric, there should not be any voting against the
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signal in this setting.
Studying experimentally whether participants would be willing to vote against their signal
when it is rational to do so raises interesting questions in itself. Violations of Bayesian
updating are widely documented in experimental research and there are two types of biases
which would lead to opposite results in terms of participants voting against their signal. The
well documented phenomenon of base-rate neglect (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1972; Grether,
1980; Erev et al., 2008) will lead agents to overweight sample information and hence would
imply that voting against the signal is not commonly observed in the experiment. However,
there is also the opposing phenomenon of conservatism (Ward, 1982) which implies that
participants overweight the prior and hence would reinforce the strategic incentives to vote
against the signal. By studying for the first time common value elections with informative
priors our experiment can shed some light on the role of these two opposing biases in strategic
voting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the model and
present the main theoretical results. In section 3 we describe the design of the experiments
and present the experimental results. In section 4 present further theoretical results where
we consider the limit case then the number of voters grows large. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 The Model
Consider a setting where N + 1 ≥ 2 voters have to decide between candidate R(ed) or
candidate B(lue) by simultaneously casting a vote for either candidate or abstaining. The
candidate that the receives the most votes wins the election. In case of a tie each candidate
wins with equal probability.
Each voter derives one unit of utility if the candidate who wins coincides with the state of
nature and zero units of utility otherwise. The state of nature is a random variable s ∈ {R,B}
where without loss of generality we assume that the probability that the state is R is given
by p ≥ 12 .1 We restrict our attention to situations where p ∈
[
1
2 , 1
)
as if p = 1 then all
voters agree that R is the best candidate and thus will vote for him regardless on any other
information they may have available. The value of p is common knowledge and we refer to
it as the common prior.
1The assumption p ≥ 1
2
is without loss of generality as if p < 1
2
then a relabeling of R to B and vice-versa
makes the analysis that follows still valid.
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Before the election, each voter i receives a signal σi ∈ {R,B} with quality qi ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
where
P (σi = s|s) = qi.
Given the state of nature, signals of different voters are conditional independent. Both
the signal received by each voter as well as the quality of such signal are private information.
The distribution of signal qualities for each voter in the population is common knowledge,
identical, independently distributed and given by the strictly increasing cumulative density
function F :
[
1
2 , 1
] → [0, 1] and integrable probability density function f : [12 , 1] → R+.
Define the average signal quality as µ =
∫ 1
1
2
qf(q)dq and consider µ ∈ (12 , 1) to avoid the
trivial cases where all voters receive a useless signal or when all voters receive a perfectly
informative signal.
Thus, before the election each voter knows the common prior, his own signal and the
quality of such signal, as well as the distribution of the quality of other voters’ signals.
However, he ignores the state of nature, the signals received by other voters, and the quality
of such signals.
A strategy for each voter is a map v : {R,B} × [12 , 1] → {∅, R,B} where v(σi, qi) is the
action of voter i who receives signal σi of quality qi, and ∅ stands for the action of abstaining.
Note that we focus on symmetric strategies: voters that are the same (same signal and
quality) behave the same. The fact that we only consider symmetric equilibria does not
undermine our main findings: if voting against the signal is possible in an equilibrium with
symmetric strategies then it is also possible in an equilibrium when asymmetric strategies
are considered. Moreover, as we argue later on in section 4.1, when there is a large number
of voters considering symmetric strategies is without loss of generality.
Note that unlike most recent papers on voting and information sharing we do not assume
a Poisson distribution for the number of voters (see the seminal work by Myerson (1998) and
Myerson (2000) and more recent references by Myatt (2012) and Nunez (2010) among others).
This assumption is often employed given its technical conveniences, namely, independent
common public information and independence of actions. However, a drawback of assuming
a Poisson distribution for the number of voters is that voters are uncertain of how many other
voters there are in the population. While this seems a suitable assumption in large elections,
with small elections (committees, for example), which are the focus of this paper, it seems
unreasonable to assume that voters ignore how many other voters there are.
Given that we focus on a small number of voters, one may be interested in knowing how
allowing voters to deliberate would affect our setting. However, since we are dealing with a
common value election, the addition of a deliberation stage in the form of a straw poll a la
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Coughlan (2000) does not affect the strategic incentives of voters and, hence, will not affect
our results.
2.2 Analysis
When a voter decides whether to vote for R, B or to abstain, he compares the payoff he
obtains under these three actions given the actions of all other voters. However, a voter can
influence his own payoff only when his vote can change the outcome of the election (i.e. he
is pivotal). This can happen if and only if candidates R and B are at most one vote apart
when counting the votes of the other N voters. Thus, let pit(v, s) be the probability that
candidate R receives the same number of votes as candidate B (i.e. there is tie) when N
voters use strategy v and the state is s. Similarly, let piR(v, s) be the probability candidate R
receives exactly one vote less than candidate B when N voters use strategy v and the state
is s. Finally, let piB(v, s) be the probability candidate B receives exactly one vote less than
candidate R when N voters use strategy v and the state is s.
Before we write down the payoff each voter obtains from playing the three different actions,
it is useful to understand how likely each state is when a voter only considers his available
information (i.e. ignoring strategic considerations). We have the following:
P (s = R|σi = R, qi) = pqi
pqi + (1− p)(1− qi) ,
P (s = B|σi = R, qi) = (1− p)(1− qi)
pqi + (1− p)(1− qi) ,
P (s = R|σi = B, qi) = p(1− qi)
p(1− qi) + (1− p)qi ,
P (s = B|σi = B, qi) = (1− p)qi
p(1− qi) + (1− p)qi .
Notice that the private signal of voter i is more informative than the prior, P (s|σi = s, qi) ≥
1
2 for all s ∈ {R,B}, if and only if qi ≥ p.
The expected utility voter i derives from voting for R compared to voting for B when the
other N voters use strategy v is then given by
ui(R,B, v) = P (s = R|σi, qi)
[
pit(v,R) +
1
2
piB(v,R) +
1
2
piR(v,R)
]
−P (s = B|σi, qi)
[
pit(v,B) +
1
2
piB(v,B) +
1
2
piR(v,B)
]
. (1)
In words, if the state is R then the increase in payoff from voting R instead of B is: 1
if there is a tie when counting all other N votes (the best candidate wins), 12 if B is one
vote behind (the best candidate is chosen as opposed to forcing a tie), and 12 if R is one vote
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behind (a tie is forced as opposed to not having the best candidate win). On the other hand,
if the state is B then the increase in payoff from voting R instead of B is: −1 if there is a
tie when counting all other N votes (the best candidate does not win), −12 if B is one vote
behind (the best candidate is not chosen as opposed to forcing a tie), and −12 if R is one vote
behind (a tie is forced as opposed to having the best candidate win).
Similarly, the expected utility voter i derives from voting for R or B compared to ab-
staining when the other N voters use strategy v is given respectively by
ui(R, ∅, v) = P (s = R|σi, qi)
[
1
2
pit(v,R) +
1
2
piR(v,R)
]
−P (s = B|σi, qi)
[
1
2
pit(v,B) +
1
2
piR(v,B)
]
, (2)
ui(B, ∅, v) = P (s = B|σi, qi)
[
1
2
pit(v,B) +
1
2
piB(v,B)
]
−P (s = R|σi, qi)
[
1
2
pit(v,R) +
1
2
piB(v,R)
]
. (3)
To simplify the exposition, we assume that if voters are indifferent between the two can-
didates they prefer the one that coincides with their signal. Similarly, if voters are indifferent
between voting for a certain candidate or abstaining, they follow their signal. As it will be
clear later on, the fact that f is integrable means that the probability that a voter is indiffer-
ent between two options (voting to one candidate or the other, or voting to either candidate
or abstaining) is zero. As such, the way indifference ties are broken has no effect in our results
and it also allows us to ignore mixed strategies.
A voter who receives signal R votes for R if and only if ui(R,B, v) ≥ 0 and ui(R, ∅, v) ≥ 0.
Such voter abstains if and only if ui(R, ∅, v) < 0 and ui(B, ∅, v) ≤ 0, and votes for B if and
only if ui(R,B, v) < 0 and ui(B, ∅, v) > 0. Thus, expressions (1), (2) and (3) are what
determines how a voter behaves given how the other voters behave.
We have the following characterization of all symmetric equilibria (all mathematical proofs
are presented in the appendix):
Theorem 1. There exists an equilibrium. The equilibrium is either of two types:
- Type 1, characterized by two cutpoints 12 ≤ q−B ≤ q+B ≤ 1 with q−B ≤ p such that
v(σi, qi) =

R if either σi = R or σi = B and qi < q
−
B ,
B if σi = B and qi ≥ q+B ,
∅ otherwise.
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- Type 2, characterized by two cutpoints 12 ≤ q+R ≤ q+B ≤ 1 such that
v(σi, qi) =

R if σi = R and qi ≥ q+R ,
B if σi = B and qi ≥ q+B ,
∅ otherwise.
In equilibrium of Type 1 all voters who receive signal R vote and they do so for candidate
R. These are the voters who receive a signal that agrees with the common prior. On the other
hand, voters who receive a signal against the common prior, i.e. signal B, behave as follows:
those with a low quality signal ignore their signal and vote according to the common prior,
those with a moderately informative signal abstain, and those with a sufficiently informative
signal vote according to their signal.
In equilibrium of Type 2 no voter votes against his signal. Note that q+R ≤ q+B implies
that those voters who receive a signal that agrees with the common prior are less likely to
abstain than those who receive a signal against. This is the case because p ≥ 12 and, thus, if
a voter receives signal R the common prior makes him trust is signal more whereas if voter
receives signal B he is less convinced about candidate B than his signal quality suggests as
the common prior goes against B.
The reason why there is not an equilibrium where voters who receive signal R vote for B
is that p ≥ 12 and, thus, a voter whose signal agrees with the common prior believes that R is
the best candidate so he either abstains or votes for R. Figures 1 and 2 present a graphical
representation of both types of equilibria.
Figure 1: Equilibrium of Type 1
σi = R
Vote for R
qi1
2
1
σi = B
Vote for R Abstain Vote for B
qi1
2
1q
−
B q
+
B
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Figure 2: Equilibrium of Type 2
σi = R
Abstain Vote for R
qi1
2
1q
+
R
σi = B
Abstain Vote for B
qi1
2
1q
+
B
The expected fraction of voters who vote against their signal in equilibrium of Type
1 is given by
∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq which, as we shall see with examples, can be a strictly positive
number. The fraction of voters who abstain is given by
∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq in equilibrium of Type
1 and
∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq +
∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq in equilibrium of Type 2. This is the so-called strategic
abstention (and swing voters curse), found for instance in McMurray (2013) and Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1996) (see McMurray (2010) for an empirical reference).
The reason why some voters vote against their signal is the following. Consider a very
simple example where there are only two voters. In this case a voter is always pivotal and
thus learns very little from the fact that he is pivotal (he still does learn some information, as
there are three different possibilities for a voter to be pivotal). In this case if a voter receives
a low quality signal against the common prior, given that he does not learn much from being
pivotal, he may still prefer to vote for what the common prior suggests if the common prior
is informative enough. This reasoning extends to more than just two voters. Assume that a
voter receives a low quality signal supporting the candidate that goes against the common
prior. If such voter is pivotal, he knows that there are mixed signals in the population, which
suggests that the common prior may be wrong. However, his information may still support
the same candidate as the common prior given that his updated belief stills put a significant
probability on such candidate because the voter’s signal is of low quality. Thus, the voter
may have incentives to disobey his signal and vote against it.
The reason why strategic abstention is possible is that if a voter receives a signal of
moderate quality and the common prior is not very informative (or he receives a signal of
high quality against an informative the common prior, but not of sufficiently high quality),
then if the voter is pivotal he may prefer to abstain and leave the decision to those who
are presumably better informed. This is because if the voter is pivotal there is a significant
chance that the best candidate is ahead by one vote as opposed to the other candidate ahead
by one vote or there being a tie. Hence, by voting the voter runs the risk of contradicting
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the opinion of most other voters who do not abstain and who have a better signal quality
than himself. In this situation the voter is better off by abstaining, even if he prefers one
candidate over the other, and leaving the decision of electing a candidate to the other more
informative voters.
Note that from the information revelation point, voting against the voter’s signal is worse
than abstaining. When a voter abstains he reveals that his signal is not very informative.
However, in an equilibrium where voters may vote against their signal, if a voter votes for R
it is not clear whether such voter received signal R or B. That is, voting against the signal
harms the chances of the best candidate winning the election more than abstention.
Theorem 1 states that in an equilibrium of Type 1, q−B ≤ p. Numerical examples shows
that this inequality can be strict. If instead of a group of voters a single voter (dictator)
chose the winning candidate, straightforward calculations show that this voter will choose to
follow his signal if and only if his signal points at candidate R or if it points at candidate B
and the signal quality is at least p. In the language of the model, if N+1 = 1 then the unique
equilibrium is Type 1 with q−B = q
+
B = p. Thus, the fact that the group of voters includes
more than just one voter means that voters are less likely to vote against their signal. That
is, more voters means that each of them has more incentives to share their signal even if such
signal is of a quality lower than the prior. Later in the paper we show that the fraction of
voters who vote against their signal converges to zero as the number of voters increases to
infinity.
As discussed in the introduction, McMurray (2013) considers a setting very similar to
ours where the main difference is that he assumes p = 12 . The consequence of this is that in
his setting the only possible equilibria is Type 2 with q+R = q
+
B . The fact that p >
1
2 is what
allows the existence of an equilibrium of Type 1 with q−B >
1
2 and an equilibrium of Type 2
with q+R < q
+
B . The comparison of our results to McMurray (2013) is explored in more detail
later on when we consider elections with a large number of voters.
It is worth pointing out the similarities between our result in Theorem 1 and Proposition 1
in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) (particularly striking is the resemblance between figures
1 and 2 and figure 1 in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)). However, both results originate
from very different sources. In our paper, voters’ behavior depends on the signal they receive,
but also on the quality of such signal. In Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), voters’ behavior
depends on the signal they receive and on their bias towards each of the candidates. Thus, the
fact that unbiased voters receive signals of different qualities mimics the behavior observed
when biased voters receive information of equal quality. A fundamental difference between
these two situations is that a voter who is biased takes such bias as given while an unbiased
voter is aware of the fact that his signal may or may not be very accurate.
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2.2.1 Numerical Examples
Next we present some examples that illustrate the results of Theorem 1. In tables 1 and 2
we calculate some of the possible equilibria when there are 4 and 5 voters respectively and
signal qualities are distributed uniformly. The parameter constellations in table 1 are the
ones used in the experiments.
Table 1: Equilibria, N + 1 = 4
p = 0.5, q ∼ U [12 , 1] p = 0.95, q ∼ U [12 , 1] p = 0.95, q ∼ U [12 , 34]
q+R = 0.67 q
−
B = 0.54 q
−
B = 0.57
q+B = 0.67 q
+
B = 0.86 q
+
B = 0.76
Table 2: Equilibria, N + 1 = 5
p = 0.5, q ∼ U [12 , 1] p = 0.8, q ∼ U [12 , 1] p = 0.95, q ∼ U [12 , 1]
q+R = 0.5 q
+
R = 0.68 q
+
R = 0.60 q
−
B = 0.59 q
+
R = 0.51 q
−
B = 0.68
q+B = 0.5 q
+
B = 0.68 q
+
B = 0.75 q
+
B = 0.59 q
+
B = 0.82 q
+
B = 0.68
Numerical results suggest that the equilibrium is unique if and only if N + 1 is even and
that if N + 1 is odd then there are exactly two equilibria. However, we have been unable
to prove this formally. The problem of uniqueness of equilibrium in voting models such as
this far from trivial (McMurray (2013)) and is often ignored (Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996, 1997, 1999)). Nevertheless, uniqueness of equilibrium is not necessary for our results.
Our characterization in Theorem 1 together with the examples above already illustrate one
of the points of this paper: the possibility for rational voters voting against their signal
when such signal is informative and abstention is allowed. On top of that, uniqueness of
equilibrium is also not required for the experimental results; we are not interested in making
point-wise prediction but in understanding whether the behavior of subjects responds the
way the theoretical results predict when we change the parameters of the model.
With respect to whether or not information is used efficiently in equilibrium, the examples
in Table 2 already tell us that this is not necessarily the case. For instance, if N + 1 = 5
and p = 0.8 then the probability with which the best candidate wins is 0.92 in Equilibrium
of Type 1 and 0.93 in the equilibrium of Type 2. Numerical results show that this difference
tends to increase if there are fewer voters. However, as we shall show in the section 4.1, for
elections with a large number of voters the best candidate wins the election with probability
one.
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2.3 Testable Predictions and Empirical Questions
In this section we describe some key qualitative properties that we are interested in testing
in the laboratory. One of the new findings in this paper is that, unlike in the symmetric
prior case studied in McMurray (2013), participants may vote against their signal if it is not
accurate enough. As discussed above, this can have important consequences for information
aggregation. We ask the following question:
Voting against one’s signal How is the propensity to vote against the signal affected by
changes in the prior p and the signal accuracy q?
From theory we would expect to see voting against the prior only if priors are asymmetric
and if signal accuracy is “low enough”. Empirically, whether this prediction holds depends
crucially on how people update their prior on the basis of the information they received.
Two different failures of Bayesian updating have been robustly documented in the literature:
(i) base-rate neglect, which leads to overweighting sampled information (Kahnemann and
Tversky (1972); Grether (1980); Erev et al. (2008)) and (ii) conservatism, which leads to
underweighting or even ignoring the sample (Ward (1982)).
Base rate neglect is not important if priors are symmetric (p = 0.5). With asymmetric
priors, however, it could potentially play an important role. Under base-rate neglect partic-
ipants would vote with their signal more often, leading to more information being revealed,
but possibly worse outcomes in terms of the efficiency of the majority decision. Conservatism
would lead to the opposite prediction. Participants would vote with the prior too often lead-
ing to both worse information aggregation and lower efficiency. Hence, while theory might be
a good predictor of behavior for symmetric priors, its predictive accuracy could be far worse
in the case of asymmetric priors if base-rate neglect or conservatism play important roles in
this setting. If participants vote too often or too seldom against their signal, information
revelation and efficiency are impacted as well. We hence ask:
Information Revelation How is information revelation affected by changes in the prior p
and the signal accuracy q?
Efficiency How is the efficiency of voting outcomes affected by changes in the prior p and
the signal accuracy q?
We would expect efficiency to increase both as priors become more asymmetric (hence
containing more information) and as signals become more accurate. However, in the presence
13
of biases, such as base-rate neglect or conservatism, this may not necessarily be the case. Our
experiments will provide an empirical test of how the symmetric and asymmetric settings
differ with regard to these issues and how potential biases affect the explanatory power of
the theory in both these two settings.
3 Experiments
3.1 Design of the Experiments
Our experiment implements the setting described in the theoretical section for N+1 = 4, i.e.
four voters. In all treatments participants played a voting game for 30 rounds. After each
round they were randomly re-matched in a new group of four voters. Each round proceeded
as follows. First, participants were reminded of the value of p. They were then shown their
private signal and informed about the accuracy of their signal qi. They were afterwards asked
to vote for either RED, BLUE or to ABSTAIN, where the order of the first two options was
randomized. At the end of each round they were informed about their own vote, the majority
vote in the group, the realized state and their payoff. Participants received 10 experimental
tokens if the majority vote matched the state and 2 tokens if it did not. At the end of the
experiment one round was randomly drawn and participants were paid for that round only
plus a show up fee of 3 tokens. Tokens were converted into GBP at a rate of 1:1.
To answer our questions regarding information revelation and efficiency we systemati-
cally vary p and q. Treatment SYM implements the symmetric setting analyzed by Mc-
Murray (2013). Both states are equally likely and signal accuracy is distributed uniformly
in [0.5, 1]. In treatment ASYM an asymmetric prior of 0.95 is implemented. Treatment
ASYM-COARSE coincides with treatment ASYM, but the signal accuracy is lower:
q ∼ U [0.5, 0.75]. In each treatment we had 24 participants organized in three matching
groups (clusters) of size 8. Theoretical predictions for these different cases can be found in
Section 2.2.1 Table 1.
The experiments were conducted in May 2015 at EssexLab at the University of Essex.
Participants earned either 13 GBP or 5 GBP depending on whether, in the round randomly
drawn for payment, the majority vote matched the state or not.2 The experiment lasted
around 45min, it was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and participants were re-
cruited using hroot.
2In May 2015, 13 GBP equalled about 20.50 US dollars and 5 GBP around 7.90 US dollars.
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3.2 Experimental Results
We first look at overall outcomes in terms of efficiency and information revelation and then
look at the individual behaviour underlying these aggregate effects.
3.2.1 Aggregate Outcomes
We start with the efficiency of voting outcomes. We would expect efficiency to increase
both as priors become more asymmetric (hence containing more information) and as signals
become more accurate. In terms of our treatments we would hence expect higher efficiency in
ASYM compared to SYM and higher efficiency inASYM compared toASYM-COARSE.
(a) Efficiency over Time (b) Voting with Signal over Time
Figure 3: Efficiency: Panel (a) shows the percentage of time the majority vote agreed with
the state over time across the three treatments. Panel (b) shows the percentage of times
participants vote with their signal over time across the three treatments.
Figure 3 (Panel (a)) shows efficiency over time across the three treatments. As expected,
efficiency is higher in ASYM compared to SYM, even though they are converging over
time and across the last 5 periods they are no longer statistically different (Table 3). By
contrast, efficiency is higher in ASYM-COARSE compared to ASYM, which is not what
we expected. The difference is not statistically significant across the first five periods (col-
umn (1) in Table 3), but it is significant across all rounds (column (2)) and significant and
substantial across the last five rounds (column (3)). In fact, in ASYM-COARSE the vote
is almost always efficient. We will explore the reasons for this effect below. There are also
some interesting time trends. While in ASYM efficiency decreases over time (OLS coeffi-
cient −0.0039∗∗∗), in SYM efficiency increases over time (0.0064∗∗∗) stabilizing at around 80
percent efficient votes.3
3OLS coefficients in brackets are from random effects OLS regressions (including a constant) where the
efficiency measure is regressed on period. Standard errors are clustered by matching group.
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All periods periods 1-5 periods 26-30
ASYM 0.169*** 0.317*** 0.0417
(0.0160) (0.0434) (0.0440)
ASYM-COARSE 0.231*** 0.325*** 0.183***
(0.0160) (0.0434) (0.0440)
Constant 0.751*** 0.625*** 0.783***
(0.0113) (0.0307) (0.0311)
Observations 2,160 360 360
Participants 72 72 72
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Random effects OLS regression of efficiency on treatment dummies. Note: (***)
significant at 1% level, (**) at 5% level and (*) at 10% level. Standard errors are clustered
by matching group.
Result 1 Voting outcomes are most efficient in ASYM-COARSE followed by ASYM and
SYM.
Information Revelation Next, we study information revelation, i.e. how much about
participants’ signals (and hence the state) is revealed via their voting behavior. Panel (b) in
Figure 3 shows that the share of participants who vote with their signal is roughly constant
across time and about the same across treatments. This, however, does not tell us much about
how much information is revealed since it is important to understand who votes against their
signal, i.e. is it participants whose signal coincides with the prior or those whose signal differs
from the prior? and how accurate is the signal of those who vote against it?
One can either study information revelation by making inference based on the theoretical
benchmark or in a purely empirical manner. We will discuss both in turn. As mentioned
above, in all the equilibria in ASYM and ASYM-COARSE only participants with a signal
that goes against the prior would ever abstain. Hence, if we make inference based on the
theoretical benchmark, the decision to abstain reveals the signal as does the decision to vote
against the prior. The decision to vote with the prior, by contrast, does not reveal (in a
deterministic sense) the signal. Can we make inference on votes that follow the prior? The
problem with such inference is that it depends on assumptions about specific equilibria being
played. In particular, the conditional probability Pr(σ|vi = BLUE) will vary depending on
the equilibrium under question. Hence, any theoretical inference be conditional on particular
equilibria. For this reason we focus on a purely empirical measure of information revelation.
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In particular, we use the ratio of post- to pre-voting Shannon entropy:
IR =
−∑s∈{R,B} p̂(s) log p̂(s)
−(p log p+ (1− p) log(1− p)) ,
where p̂(s) denotes an outside observer’s belief on the state after observing the distribution
of votes (but without knowledge of the signals received by voters). In particular p̂(s) denotes
the probability that an outside observer (endowed with an uninformative prior), who knows
the empirical frequencies Pr(σi, qi|vi), attaches to state s after seeing the vote. If IR < 1,
then this outside observer will be more informed about s compared to someone who just
knows the prior and if IR > 1, then the prior reveals more information about s than the
vote.
RED state BLUE state
Votes σ = RED Votes σ = BLUE
SYM
RED 0.57 0.95 (0.76) RED 0.23 0.18 (0.63)
BLUE 0.15 0.26 (0.70) BLUE 0.57 0.86 (0.74)
abstain 0.28 0.57 (0.59) abstain 0.20 0.45 (0.59)
ASYM
RED 0.66 1 (0.85) RED 0.23 0.20 (0.67)
BLUE 0.33 0.5 (0.6) BLUE 0.57 0.80 (0.74)
abstain - - abstain 0.20 0.33 (0.62)
ASYM-COARSE
RED 0.40 0.85 (0.61) RED 0.04 0.52 (0.63)
BLUE 0.40 0.60 (0.61) BLUE 0.81 0.79 (0.62)
abstain 0.20 0.60 (0.59) abstain 0.15 0.57 (0.61)
Table 4: Vote Distribution and share of participants voting (RED, BLUE or abstaining)
overall and conditional on observing a RED signal (in brackets average signal accuracy) for
each of the three treatments and the two states.
Table 4 gives an overview of voting behaviour. In SYM, participants tend to vote RED or
BLUE with about equal frequencies. However, there is also a substantial share of abstentions.
Consistently with theory, voters rarely vote against their signal in this condition. Since the
setting is symmetric, there are, as expected, no differences between RED and BLUE signals.
Let us compute the population posterior for RED, i.e. p̂(RED). In the red state, observing
someone vote RED is indicative of a signal RED with probability 0.95 with average accuracy
of 0.76, observing an abstention reveals RED with probability 0.57 (average accuracy 0.59)
and observing BLUE indicates RED with probability 0.26 (average accuracy 0.70). The
population posterior p̂(RED) is hence 0.533 in the red state and 0.46 in the blue state,
implying IRSYM < 1. Hence knowledge of the empirical frequencies Pr(σi, qi|vi) as well as
the vote distribution is informative about the state, as in the RED state p̂(RED) > 0.5
and in the BLUE state p̂(RED) < 0.5. The population posterior reveals marginally more
information about the state than the uninformative prior.
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In treatment ASYM most voters vote with BLUE, but there is also a substantial share
of abstention and a significant share of voting for RED. Observing someone vote RED is
indicative of a signal RED with probability 1 with average accuracy of 0.85 while observing
BLUE indicates RED with probability 0.33 (average accuracy 0.6). Two problems with
information revelation become apparent. First, since as predicted by theory a substantial
share of participants who vote for BLUE actually saw a RED signal, it is harder to make
inference from observing BLUE votes. Second, and this goes against theoretical insights, 15
percent of those voting for RED did actually see a BLUE signal. The population posterior
p̂(RED) is 0.76 in the red state and p̂(RED) = 0.41 in the blue state implying IRASYM >
1. The population posterior reveals less information compared to the prior, but both are
informative in this case.4 In treatment ASYM-COARSE patterns are similar to those in
ASYM, but lower signal quality means worse inference compared to treatment ASYM, but
still information is lost via voting. The population posterior is p̂(RED) = 0.61 in the red
state and p̂(RED) = 0.46 in the blue state
As we expected from theory, the setting with asymmetric priors is problematic in terms of
information revelation. An outside observer, who knows the empirical frequencies Pr(σi, qi|vi)
as well as the vote distribution, will have a less accurate idea of the state s compared to
someone just relying on the prior in both treatments ASYM and ASYM-COARSE. It
should be noted, though, that in all treatments voting is informative with p̂(RED) > 0.5 in
the RED state and p̂(RED) < 0.5 in the BLUE state.
Result 2 Voting outcomes are informative in all treatments. Voting reveals more informa-
tion than the (uninformative) prior in SYM, but less information than the prior in
ASYM and ASYM-COARSE.
3.2.2 Individual Behaviour
In this subsection we turn our attention to individual voting strategies to get a better under-
standing for what underlies our aggregate findings.
Figure 4 illustrates how voters with RED (left panel) and BLUE (right panel) signals
vote in treatment SYM. As expected, we don’t see substantial differences between the two
cases. Irrespective of the signal received, only very few participants vote against their signal.
The share of abstentions is high (around 60%) if the signal is uninformative and decreases
sharply around q ≈ 0.6 in line with theoretical predictions. The fact that voters largely vote
4Note that there are only few instances where the state is RED in treatments ASYM and ASYM-
COARSE. If we aggregate across both states results are very similar.
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(a) RED signal (b) BLUE signal
Figure 4: The figure shows the vote distribution (red, abstain, blue) conditional on signal
accuracy as well as theoretical threshold (vertical line). Treatment SYM.
with their signal if signal accuracy is good enough is what underlies the comparatively good
information revelation properties highlighted earlier.
(a) RED signal (b) BLUE signal
Figure 5: The figure shows the vote distribution (red, abstain, blue) conditional on signal
accuracy as well as theoretical thresholds (vertical lines) in equilibrium of type II. Treatment
ASYM
Figure 5 shows how participants vote depending on their signal in treatment ASYM. In
line with the symmetric equilibrium prediction, if participants receive a BLUE signal they
essentially always vote BLUE (panel (b)). There is some abstention for low signal accuracy
(below 0.65) and a few votes for RED. Despite the fact that only a small proportion of those
receiving a BLUE signal vote RED, this small amount of noise can have a big impact on
information revelation as seen above. The reason is that, many more participants do receive
a BLUE signal than a RED signal.
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(a) RED signal (b) BLUE signal
Figure 6: The figure shows the vote distribution (red, abstain, blue) conditional on signal
accuracy as well as theoretical thresholds (vertical lines) in equilibrium of type II. Treatment
ASYM-COARSE.
Conditional on receiving a RED signal the majority of participants do not vote RED
(between 90% if q = 0.5 and around 60% if q = 0.9). Around 40-50% of participants vote
against their signal, i.e. vote BLUE when their signal was RED. This share is pretty stable
across levels of accuracy q (see also columns (1) and (3) in Table 7). The share of participants
abstaining is around 30% for low signal accuracy and decreasing as signal accuracy increases
with participants starting to vote RED. Hence, participants with a RED signal vote according
to their signal too much if signal accuracy is bad and too little if signal accuracy is good.
Hence, rather than a general tendency towards conservatism or base-rate neglect we find that
participants do not react enough to the accuracy of their signal.
Figure 6 shows the analogous graph for treatment ASYM-COARSE, where signals are
less accurate. Behavior conditional on a BLUE signal is very similar to treatment ASYM
with most participants voting BLUE. Conditional on receiving a RED signal, participants
now are even more likely to vote against the signal with almost 80% voting BLUE if q = 0.5,
i.e. if the signal is uninformative. The percentage shrinks for higher levels of q, but remains
substantial at 60% even if q = 0.9.
Table 5 shows how odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients) from multinomial logit regres-
sion on voting outcomes (categorized as “voting with the signal”, “abstaining” or “voting
against the signal”) change with the signal accuracy separately for the case where a RED
(columns (1)-(3)) or a BLUE (columns (4)-(6)) signal was received. The baseline category is
to vote with the signal.5
5Tables 8 and 7 in Appendix C show OLS regressions on binary outcomes of “Abstention” and “Voting
against the signal”, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RED signal BLUE signal
SYM ASYM ASYM SYM ASYM ASYM
COARSE COARSE
Vote with signal
Abstain
q 0.000*** 74.460*** 53.360 0.005*** 0.001 0.097
(0.000) (103.500) (192.800) (0.000) (0.002) (0.189)
Constant 135.100*** 0.024*** 0.010** 123.700*** 0.754** 0.525
(101.100) (0.023) (0.023) (104.200) (0.660) (0.633)
Vote against signal
q 0.044*** 0.887 5.681 0.001*** 0.025 0.016
(0.051) (1.076) (12.700) (0.001) (0.057) (0.058)
Constant 1.816 0.799 0.133 9.781** 0.347 0.703
(1.507) (0.624) (0.177) (11.270) (0.538) (0.350)
Observations 385 243 181 335 477 539
Standard Errors Eform in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Odds Ratios (exponentiated coefficients) from multinomial logit regression on voting
outcomes categorized as “voting with the signal”, “abstaining” or “voting against the signal”.
Note: (***) significant at 1% level, (**) at 5% level and (*) at 10% level.
The table shows that conditional on receiving a BLUE signal (columns (4)-(6)), a one-
unit increase in q leads to relative odds to vote against the signal or to abstain that are
substantially lower than what they were before. This decline is observed across all treatments,
most dramatic in SYM (with odds ratios as low as 0.005∗∗∗ and 0.001∗∗∗) and least strong
and not statistically significant in ASYM-COARSE.
Conditional on receiving a RED signal (columns (1)-(3)) the same pattern can be observed
in treatment SYM: a one-unit increase in q leads to a substantial decrease in relative odds to
vote against the signal or to abstain (relative to voting with the signal). This is not the case
in treatment ASYM, though. While participants become less likely to vote against RED as
signal accuracy increases (exp coefficient 0.088), they do not vote with the signal more, but
instead decide to abstain (exp coefficient 74.46∗∗∗).
To sum up, behaviour in the experiment is largely in line with what we expected from
theory. Participants are not hesitant to vote against their signal if its quality is low, but they
do not react enough to signal accuracy. More informative priors lead to higher efficiency, as
expected, but against our expectations, more informative signals do not.
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4 Further Theoretical Results
4.1 Large Elections
In this section we extend our theoretical results by focusing on elections where the number
of voters tends to infinite. Our first result is that in large elections the fraction of voters who
vote against their signal converges to zero and, moreover, the difference in behavior between
those who receive different signals of the same quality also converges to zero.
Theorem 2. The equilibrium in a large election is either Type 1 with
∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq → 0 or
Type 2 with
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq → 0.
The first part of the theorem states that in equilibrium of Type 1 we have
∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq → 0.
Since in such equilibrium q−B ≤ q+B , we have then that
∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq → 0. Therefore, the
proportion of voters that vote against their signal converges to zero. Note that it may happen
that the number of voters who vote against their signal is bounded away from zero, that is, it
could be that limN→∞(N +1)
∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq > ε for some ε > 0. However, the number of voters
voting against their signal in the population is insignificant compared with the number of
voters who vote according to their signal.
Another implication of first part of the theorem is that the difference in behavior between
those who receive signal R or B converges to zero. A voter who receives signal R always
votes for R while the fraction of voters who do not vote for B when they receive signal B is∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq, which converges to zero.
The second part of the theorem states that in equilibrium of Type 2 we have
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq →
0. Again this implies that the difference in behavior between those who receive signal R or
B converges to zero. Therefore, Theorem 2 implies that when the number of voters tends
to infinity the fraction of voters who vote against their signal (
∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq) and the fraction
of voters whose behavior depend on the specific signal received (
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq) vanishes in the
limit. That is, as the number of voters increases the effect of an asymmetric common prior
(p > 12) vanishes in the limit and the results in McMurray (2013) apply. (i.e. the equilibrium
is characterized by a cut-point q that determines who abstains and who votes for his signal
independently on the particular signal received).
The reason behind the result in Theorem 2 is the following. Assume that
∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq does
not converge to zero. In this case if a voter is pivotal then it must be that in proportion more
voters received signal B than R: as
∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq does not converge to zero, not all voters who
receive signal B vote for B yet all voters who receive signal R vote for R. If more voters
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receive signal B than R then since the average signal quality µ is greater than 12 by law of
large numbers the state of nature is B with probability one. This implies that all voters
should vote for B, contradicting the fact that all voters who receive signal R prefer to vote
for R.
A similar argument shows that as the number of voters grows large in equilibrium of Type
2 we must have
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq → 0. If ∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq does not converge to zero then if a voter is
pivotal it must be that a greater proportion of voters receive signal B than signal R. This is
because a higher fraction of those voters who receive signal B compared to those who receive
signal R abstain. Law of large number then means that the state is B with probability
one, which implies that all voters should vote for B. This represents a contradiction to the
characterization of equilibrium of Type 2.
In this paper we consider only symmetric strategies. The fact that an equilibrium where
some voters vote against their signal exists in symmetric strategies implies that it also exists
when non-symmetric strategies are considered. Moreover, the fact that we consider only
symmetric strategies is without loss of generality in case there is a large number of voters.
This is because in large elections the probability that the vote of an specific voter determines
the outcome is zero. Thus, all voters face the same distribution of strategies played by
other voters. Given that voters are never (with probability zero) indifferent between the
available options (voting for either candidate and abstaining), all voters chose the same
strategy conditional on the signal received and its quality. That is, voters follow symmetric
strategies. For more on this see McMurray (2013).
Our final result states that in large elections the best candidate wins with probability one.
This result is in line with the Condorcet Jury Theorem and the findings in previous literature
(see for instance Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997, 1999) and McMurray (2013)).
Proposition 1. The equilibrium in a large election is such that the best candidate wins with
probability one.
Given the result in Theorem 2, whether a voter chooses to vote or to abstain depends on
the quality of his signal, not on the value of the signal itself. Thus, for a given state of nature
and given level of abstention, the best candidate is expected to receive a share µ of the votes
while the other candidate is expected to receive a share 1− µ of the votes. Since µ > 12 law
of large numbers implies that the best candidate wins with probability one.
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5 Conclusions
We presented a common value election setting where voters have private information of
different qualities. We showed both theoretically and experimentally that voters may have
incentives to vote against their private information, even if such private information is useful,
all have the same preferences, and abstention is allowed. Moreover, we found that elections
do not generally aggregate information efficiently. On top of that, experimental subjects used
their private information more than what is rational. This produced the unexpected result
that lower quality of information is better; the reduction in the quality of private information
made subjects trust their information less, which reduced the efficiency loss due to subjects
following their private information too often.
We also found that the behavior of voters when they receive information of different
qualities resembles the behavior of voters who receive information of the same quality but that
have different preferences (i.e. they may be biased towards either candidate). This suggest
that the observed different biases towards candidates need not be the result of different
preferences and it could be the result of different rational beliefs about who is the best
candidate.
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A Appendix: Proofs
The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. The best response of any voter i against any strategy v played by the other N
voters is given v′, which is characterized by four cutpoints q−R , q
+
R , q
−
B and q
+
B in
[
1
2 , 1
]
such
that
v′(θi, qi) =

R if either σi = R and qi ≥ q+R or σi = B and qi < q−B ,
B if either σi = R and qi < q
−
R or σi = B and qi ≥ q+B ,
∅ otherwise.
Proof. Take any arbitrary voter i and assume all voters except i use strategy v. Consider
equations (1), (2) and (3) and assume that σi = R. We have that both Eu(R, v)−Eu(B, v)
and Eu(R, v) − Eu(∅, v) are increasing in qi. Therefore, there exists a x ∈ [0, 1] such that
both equations are positive and voter i votes for R whenever qi ≥ x. Since qi ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
if we
define q+R = max
{
1
2 , x
}
we have that voter i votes for R whenever qi ≥ q+R .
Moreover, both Eu(B, v)−Eu(R, v) and Eu(B, v)−Eu(∅, v) are decreasing in qi. There-
fore, there exists a y with 0 ≤ y ≤ x such that both equations are positive and voter i
votes for B whenever qi < y. If we define q
−
R = max
{
1
2 , y
}
we have that voter i votes for R
whenever qi < q
−
R .
The final possibility is that both Eu(R, v)−Eu(∅, v) and Eu(B, v)−Eu(∅, v) are negative,
which can happen if and only if qi ∈ [y, x) or, in other words, qi ∈ [q−R , q+R). In this case,
voter i prefers to abstain.
A similar reasoning when σi = B leads to the conclusion in the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1. An Equilibrium Exists
First we demonstrate existence. Given the result in Lemma 1, we know that for any
strategy v employed by the other N voters every voter employs a strategy that is charac-
terized by four cutpoints q−R , q
+
R , q
−
B and q
+
B . Define the function φ :
[
1
2 , 1
]4 → [12 , 1]4 where
φ(q−R , q
+
R , q
−
B , q
+
B) is the best response of any voter to a situation where all other N voters
employ an strategy characterized the four cutpoints q−R , q
+
R , q
−
B , q
+
B . We have to prove that φ
has a fixed point. By the fixed point theorem, since the set
[
1
2 , 1
]4
is convex and compact in
the Euclidean space we are left to show that φ is continuous.
When N voters are using strategy v characterized by the four cutpoints q−R , q
+
R , q
−
B and
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q+B we have that
pit(v,R) =
N2 ∑
sR(R)=0
N2 −sR(R)∑
sB(R)=0
N−2(sR(R)+sB(R))∑
sR(∅)=0
sR(R)+sB(R)∑
sR(B)=0
N !
sR(R)!sB(R)!sR(∅)!sR(B)!(sR(R) + sB(R)− sR(B))!(N − 2(sR(R) + sB(R))− sR(∅))!
×
[∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
]sR(R) [∫ q−B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]sB(R)
×
[∫ q+R
q−R
qf(q)dq
]sR(∅) [∫ q−R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]sR(B)
×
[∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]sR(R)+sB(R)−sR(B) [∫ q+B
q−B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2(sR(R)+sB(R))−sR(∅)
(4)
Since F (q) =
∫ q
1
2
f(q)dq we have that F is continuous and, because it is a cumulative
density function, it is bounded in [0, 1]. Therefore, F is integrable and moreover continuous
with respect to the integration limits. Thus,
∫
qf(q)d(q) = qF (q) − ∫ F (q)dq is continuous
with respect to the integration limits. As a result, pit(v,R) is continuous with respect to the
cutpoints q−R , q
+
R , q
−
B and q
+
B .
It can be shown in a similar fashion that pit(v, s), piB(v, s) and piR(v, s) are continuous
with respect to the cutpoints q−R , q
+
R , q
−
B and q
+
B for all s ∈ {R,B}. Hence, we have that
Eu(R, v)−Eu(B, v), Eu(R, v)−Eu(∅, v) and Eu(R, v)−Eu(∅, v) are continuous with respect
to the cutpoints q−R , q
+
R , q
−
B and q
+
B . Thus, φ is continuous as we wanted to show.
Equilibrium is of Two Types
Given the result in Lemma 1, any equilibrium is characterized by the four threshold
values q−R , q
+
R , q
−
B and q
+
B . Assume that q
−
B >
1
2 , then we have that Eu(R, v)− Eu(B, v) > 0
and Eu(R, v) − Eu(∅, v) > 0 for all i with σi = B and qi ∈
[
1
2 , q
−
B
)
, which implies that
Eu(R, v)−Eu(B, v) > 0 and Eu(R, v)−Eu(∅, v) > 0 for all i with σi = R and qi ∈
[
1
2 , q
−
B
)
.
This means that q−R , q
+
R =
1
2 , which leads to equilibrium of Type 1 in the proposition.
Assume now that q−B =
1
2 and q
+
B >
1
2 . In this case we have that Eu(B, v)−Eu(∅, v) < 0
for all i with σi = B and qi ∈
[
1
2 , q
+
B
)
, which implies that Eu(B, v) − Eu(∅, v) < 0 for all i
with σi = R and qi ∈
[
1
2 , q
+
B
)
. This means that q−R =
1
2 , which leads to equilibrium of type 2
in the proposition.
Finally, assume that q−B = q
+
B =
1
2 . We proceed by showing that pit(v,R) + piB(v,R) ≥
pit(v,B)+piB(v,B). If this were true, and since q
+
B =
1
2 implies that Eu(B, v)−Eu(∅, v) ≥ 0
for all i with σi = B and qi ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
, equation (3) together with the fact that p ≥ 12 implies
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that pit(v,B)+piB(v,B) ≥ pit(v,R)+piB(v,R), which would represent a contradiction (unless
q−B = q
+
B = q
−
R = q
+
R = p =
1
2 , which is an equilibrium of either Type in the proposition).
First we show that pit(v,R)− pit(v,B) ≥ 0 for all 12 ≤ q−R ≤ q+R ≤ 1. Note that
pit(v,R) =
N2 ∑
j=0
j∑
r=0
N !
j!(j − r)!r!(N − 2j)![∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
]j [∫ q−R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]j−r [∫ 1
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]r [∫ q+R
q−R
qf(q)dq
]N−2j
,
pit(v,B) =
N2 ∑
j=0
j∑
r=0
N !
j!(j − r)!r!(N − 2j)![∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j [∫ q−R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j−r [∫ 1
1
2
qf(q)dq
]r [∫ q+R
q−R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j
.
Given that qi ≥ 12 for all voter i we have that
pit(v,R)− pit(v,B) ≥
N2 ∑
j=0
j∑
r=0
N !
j!(j − r)!r!(N − 2j)![∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]r
−
[∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
1
2
qf(q)dq
]r .
Thus, if q+R =
1
2 or q
+
R = 1 then pit(v,R)−pit(v,B) ≥ 0. Consider now the cases where q+R ∈(
1
2 , 1
)
. Using once more that qi ≥ 12 for all i, a necessary condition for pit(v,R)−pit(v,B) ≥ 0
is that[∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
]r [∫ 1
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]r
≥
[∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]r [∫ 1
1
2
qf(q)dq
]r
.
This can be written as[∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
][∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq +
∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]
≥[∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
][∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq +
∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]
.
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In other words, ∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
≥
∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
,
∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
,
∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
,
∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq
.
Since it is true that ∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+R
q+Rf(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
q+Rf(q)dq
=
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq
,
we have that pit(v,R)− pit(v,B) ≥ 0.
Proceeding in a similar fashion, it can be shown that piB(v,R)− piB(v,B) ≥ 0. Thus, we
have that pit(v,R)− piB(v,R) ≥ pii(v,B)− piB(v,B) as required.
In Equilibrium of Type 1 q−B ≤ p
We can use the algebra from the previous part of the proof to show that in equilibrium of
Type 1 pit(v,R)− pit(v,B) ≤ 0 and piR(v,B)− piR(v,R) ≥ 0 for all 12 ≤ q−B ≤ q+B ≤ 1. Hence,
equation (2) together with the definition of q−B implies p(1− q−B) ≥ (1− p)q−B , which in turn
implies q−B ≤ p.
In Equilibrium of Type 2 q+B ≥ q+R
Next we prove that in any equilibrium of type 2 it must be that q+B ≥ q+R . Assume the
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opposite, q+R > q
+
B . Note that in any Type 2 equilibrium we have that
pit(v,R) =
N2 ∑
j=0
[∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j
×
N−2j∑
r=0
N !
j!j!r!(N − 2j − r)!
×
[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]r [∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j−r
.
Thus, it is true that
pit(v,R) =
N2 ∑
j=0
[∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j
×
N−2j2 ∑
k=0
N !
j!j!k!(N − 2j − k)!
×
[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k [∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k
×
[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]N−2j−2k
+
[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j−2k , (5)
pit(v,B) =
N2 ∑
j=0
[∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
]j
×
N−2j2 ∑
k=0
N !
j!j!k!(N − 2j − k)!
×
[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k [∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k
×
[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j−2k
+
[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]N−2j−2k . (6)
We now show that pit(v,R) − pit(v,B) ≥ 0 in three steps. First, we have that q+R > q+B
implies[∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j
≥
[∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
]j
(7)
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for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . .} if and only if∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
[∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq +
∫ q+R
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]
≥
∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
[∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq +
∫ q+R
q+B
qf(q)dq
]
.
which can be rewritten as∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
∫ q+R
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq ≥
∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
∫ q+R
q+B
qf(q)dq,
∫ q+R
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq∫ q+R
q+B
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
,
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq∫ q+R
q+B
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
,
∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq∫ q+R
q+B
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq
,
which given that ∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq∫ q+R
q+B
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+R
q+Rf(q)dq∫ q+R
q+B
q+Rf(q)dq
,
=
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq
,
proves that equation (7) holds true when q+R > q
+
B .
Second, we have that q+R > q
+
B implies[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k [∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k
≥
[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k [∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k
(8)
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for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . .} if and only if∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq
≥
∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
,
∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq
,
∫ q+R
q+B
qf(q)dq∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq
,
which given that ∫ q+R
q+B
qf(q)dq∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ q+R
q+B
q+Bf(q)dq∫ q+B
1
2
q+Bf(q)dq
,
=
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq
,
proves that equation (8) holds true when q+R > q
+
B .
Third, we have that q+R > q
+
B implies[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]m
+
[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]m
≥[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]m
+
[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]m
(9)
for all m ∈ {0, 1, . . .} if and only if[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq +
∫ q+R
q+B
qf(q)dq
]m
−
[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]m
≥[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq +
∫ q+R
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]m
−
[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]m
which is always true for m = 0 and true for m ∈ {1, 2, . . .} if and only if
m∑
l=1
(
m
l
)[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]m−l [∫ q+R
q+B
qf(q)dq
]l
≥
m∑
l=1
(
m
l
)[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]m−l [∫ q+R
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]l
.
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Since the expression above is true we have that q+R > q
+
B implies equation (9) as required.
Therefore, we have shown that q+R > q
+
B implies equations (7), (8) and (9) are true. Hence,
from equations (5) and (6) we have that q+R > q
+
B implies pit(v,R)− pit(v,B) ≥ 0.
Equations (2) and (3) together with the fact that q+R > q
+
B and p ≥ 12 imply that
q+R (pit(v,R) + piR(v,R)) ≤ (1− q+R) (pit(v,B) + piR(v,B)) ,
q+R (pit(v,B) + piB(v,B)) > (1− q+R) (pit(v,R) + piB(v,R)) .
Given that, as we have just shown, q+R > q
+
B implies pit(v,R) − pit(v,B) ≥ 0, the two
expressions above imply
(1− q+R) (piR(v,B)− piB(v,R)) > q+R (piR(v,R)− piB(v,B)) . (10)
Note now that
piB(v,R) =
N2 ∑
j=1
[∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j−1
×
N−2j+12 ∑
k=0
N !
j!j!k!(N − 2j + 1− k)!
×
[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k [∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k
×
[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k
+
[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k ,
piR(v,B) =
N2 ∑
j=1
[∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j−1 [∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
]j
×
N−2j+12 ∑
k=0
N !
j!j!k!(N − 2j + 1− k)!
×
[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k [∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k
×
[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k
+
[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k ,
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and similarly for piR(v,R) and piB(v,B). Define
KR =
N−2j+12 ∑
k=0
N !
j!j!k!(N − 2j − k + 1)!
×
[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k [∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k
×
[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k
+
[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k ,
KB =
N−2j+12 ∑
k=0
N !
j!j!k!(N − 2j − k + 1)!
×
[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k [∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k
×
[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k
+
[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k .
Then, equations (8) and (9) imply KR ≥ KB. Moreover, as q+R > q+B implies equation (7),
we have that
(1− q+R) (piR(v,B)− piB(v,R)) ≤ (1− q+R)
(∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq −
∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
)
KB,
q+R (piR(v,R)− piB(v,B)) ≥ q+R
(∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq −
∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
)
KR.
This means that equation (10) holds only if
(1− q+R)
(∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq −
∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
)
KB ≥ q+R
(∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq −
∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
)
KR,
(1− q+R)
(∫ q+R
q+B
qf(q)dq
)
≥ q+R
(∫ q+R
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
)
,(∫ q+R
q+B
qf(q)dq
)
≥
(∫ q+R
q+B
q+Rf(q)dq
)
,
holds. However, given that q+R > q
+
B the expression above is false. This leads to a contradic-
tion, which means that the claim q+R > q
+
B is false as required.
The following Lemma from Feddersen and Pessendorfer (1996) is used in the proof of the
Theorem 2.
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Lemma 2 (Lemma 0 in Feddersen and Pessendorfer (1996)). Let (aN , bN , cN )
∞
N=1 a sequence
that satisfies (aN , bN , cN ) ∈ [0, 1]3 and aN < bN − δ and δ < cN for all N and some δ > 0.
Then, for i = 0, 1 as N →∞∑N
2
−i
j=0
N !
(j+i)!j!(N−2j−i)!c
N−2j−i
N a
j
N∑N
2
−i
j=0
N !
(j+i)!j!(N−2j−i)!c
N−2j−i
N b
j
N
→ 0.
Proof of Theorem 2. Equilibrium of Type 1
First we show that as N → ∞ the equilibrium of Type 1 is such that ∫ q+B1
2
f(q)dq → 0.
Assume for now that there exists a ρ > 0 such that
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq > ρ for all N and consider an
equilibrium of Type 1 and assume that there exists a ε > 0 such that either
∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq ≥ ε or∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq ≥ ε for allN . We have that there exists a δ1 > 0 such that σQQσAQ−δ1 > σAAσQA
if and only if ∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
(∫ 1
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq +
∫ q−B
1
2
qf(q)dq
)
− δ1 >∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
(∫ 1
1
2
qf(q)dq +
∫ q−B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
)
,
∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
(∫ 1
q−B
(1− q)f(q)dq +
∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq
)
− δ1 >∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
(∫ 1
q−B
qf(q)dq +
∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq
)
,
∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
(∫ q+B
q−B
(1− q)f(q)dq +
∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq
)
− δ1 >∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
(∫ q+B
q−B
qf(q)dq +
∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq
)
.
R necessary condition for this is∫ 1
q+B
(q − q+B)f(q)dq
∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq +
∫ 1
q+B
(2q − 1)f(q)dq
∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq − δ1 > 0,∫ 1
q+B
(q − q+B)f(q)dq
∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq + (2q−B − 1)
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq
∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq − δ1 > 0.
By assumption
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq > ρ for some ρ > 0. Therefore, if
∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq ≥ ε then
q−B ≥ F−1(ε) and the expression above is true for any δ1 ∈ (0, (2F−1(ε)− 1)ρε).6
6F−1 exists because f is integrable and, hence, F is continuous.
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Assume
∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq < ε, which implies that
∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq ≥ ε. Note that ∫ 1q+B f(q)dq > ρ for
some ρ > 0 implies that for all ρ¯ ∈ (0, ρ) there exists a β > 0 such that ∫ 1q+B+β f(q)dq > ρ¯,
fix such ρ and consider its corresponding β. Thus, a necessary condition for σQQσAQ − δ1 >
σAAσQA is ∫ 1
q+B
(q − q+B)f(q)dq
∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq − δ1 > 0,∫ 1
q+B+β
βf(q)dq
∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq − δ1 > 0,
βρ¯
∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq − δ1 > 0,
βρ¯ε− δ1 > 0.
Hence, for any δ1 ∈ (0,min{(2F−1(ε)−1)ρε, βρ¯ε}) we have that σQQσAQ−δ1 > σAAσQA.
If
∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq < ε for all ε > 0 then σ∅s → 0. Since σQQσAQ − δ1 > σAAσQA implies
lim
N→∞
(σAAσQA)
N
2
−i
(σQQσAQ)
N
2
−i → 0
for i = 0, 1, we have pit(v,R)pit(v,B) → 0 and, if
∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq = 0, also that piR(v,R)piR(v,B) → 0 and
piB(v,R)
piB(v,B)
→ 0.
If
∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq = 0 then piR(v,R) = piR(v,B) = piB(v,R) = piB(v,B) = 0.
On the other hand, if
∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq ≥ ε then there exists a δ2 > 0 such that σ∅s > δ2. Define
δ = min {δ1, δ2}. By Lemma 2 we have that as N grows large pit(v,R)pit(v,B) → 0,
piR(v,R)
piR(v,B)
→ 0 and
piB(v,R)
piB(v,B)
→ 0.
Therefore, equations (2) and (3) then imply q−B → 12 and q+B → 12 which in turn implies∫ q−B
1
2
f(q)dq → 0 and ∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq → 0, which contradicts the fact that either ∫ q−B1
2
f(q)dq ≥ ε
or
∫ q+B
q−B
f(q)dq ≥ ε for a fixed ε.
Assume now that for all ρ > 0 there exists an N¯ such that for all N ≥ N¯ , we have∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq ≤ ρ. Fix a ρ ∈ (0, 12) and the corresponding N¯ . This means that at most a
fraction ρ of voters vote for B for any N ≥ N¯ . In equilibrium of Type 1, q+R = 12 and all
voters who receive signal R vote for R. Hence, if a voter is pivotal it must be that at most
a fraction ρ of voters plus one received signal R. Since ρ can be chosen as small as desired
and N as large as desired, we have that if a voter is pivotal then the fraction of voters who
received signal R is negligible compared to the fraction of voters who received signal B and,
hence, the probability that the state of nature is B converges to one when a voter is pivotal
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by law of large numbers. By equation (3) this implies q+B → 12 which contradicts the fact that∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq ≤ ρ.
Equilibrium of Type 2
We prove next that in an equilibrium of Type 2 we must have
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq → 0. Assume
for now that there exists a ρ > 0 such that
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq > ρ for all N . Consider an equilibrium
of Type 2 and suppose there exists a ε > 0 such that
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq ≥ ε for all N . We have that
a necessary condition for there to be a δ1 > 0 such that σQQσAQ − δ1 > σAAσQA is∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq − δ1 >
∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq,∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq − δ1 >
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq
∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq,
∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq − δ1 >
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq
∫ q+B
q+R
qf(q)dq,
∫ 1
q+B
(q − q+B)f(q)dq
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq > δ1.
Since
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq > ρ for some ρ > 0 then for all ρ¯ ∈ (0, ρ) there exists a β > 0 such
that
∫ 1
q+B+β
f(q)dq > ρ¯, fix such ρ and consider its corresponding β. Moreover, by assumption∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq ≥ ε. Thus, if we choose any δ1 ∈ (0, βρˆε) then σQQσAQ − δ1 > σAAσQA.
Given that
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq ≥ ε it is true that ∫ q+B1
2
f(q)dq ≥ ε and, hence, there exists a δ2 > 0
such that σ∅s > δ2. Define δ = min {δ1, δ2}. Then by Lemma 2 we have then that as N grows
large pit(v,R)pit(v,B) → 0,
piR(v,R)
piR(v,B)
→ 0 and piB(v,R)piB(v,B) → 0. Equations (2) and (3) then imply q
+
B → 12
which in turn implies
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq → 0, this contradicts the fact that ∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq > ε for a
fixed ε.
Assume now that for all ρ > 0 there exists an N¯ such that for all N ≥ N¯ , we have∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq ≤ ρ. Fix a ρ ∈ (0, 12) and the corresponding N¯ . This means that at most a
fraction ρ of voters vote for B for any N ≥ N¯ . In equilibrium of Type 2, q−B = 12 and we
have two possibilities. If for all ρ > 0 there exists an N such that for all N ≥ N¯ we have∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq ≤ ρ, then ∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq ≤ ρ which is what the result in the Theorem states. If,
on the other hand, there exists a ε > 0 such that
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq ≥ ε for all N , then at least a
fraction ε of voters who receive signal R vote for R. If a voter is pivotal, it must be because
at most a fraction ρ of voters plus one receive signal R. However, since ρ can be chosen as
small as desired and N + 1 as large as desired, the fraction of voters who receive signal R
must be arbitrarily small as otherwise a fraction ε of them vote for R against the fraction
ρ that vote for B and the voter is not pivotal. Therefore, the probability that the state of
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nature is B converges to one when a voter is pivotal by law of large numbers. By equation
(3) this implies q+B → 12 which contradicts the fact that
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq ≤ ρ.
Proof of Proposition 1. Using the proof of Theorem 2 we have that either
∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq → 0 or∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq → 0. Assume first that ∫ q+B1
2
f(q)dq → 0. In this case almost all voters vote for
the candidate that coincides with their signal (for all δ > 0 there exists a N for which the
proportion of voters who do not is smaller than δ). Therefore, by law of large numbers the
proportion of voters who vote for the candidate that coincides with the state of nature is µ
while the proportion of voters who vote for the other candidate is 1−µ. Since µ > 12 implies
that there exists a ε > 0 such that µ−ε > 12 , we have that most voters vote for the candidate
that coincides with the state of nature which gives the desired result.
Assume now
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq → 0. In this case all voters who do not abstain vote for the
candidate that coincides with their signal and, furthermore, the decision on whether to vote
or not is independent on the signal received (for all δ > 0 there exists a N for which the
number of voters choose whether to abstain or not depending on their signal is smaller than
δ). Therefore, by law of large numbers the proportion of voters who vote for the candidate
that coincides with the state of nature is (N + 1)
∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq while the proportion of voters
who vote for the other candidate is (N + 1)
∫ 1
q+B
(1 − q)f(q)dq. If there exists a ρ > 0 such
that
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq > ρ for all N + 1 then for all ρ¯ ∈ (0, ρ) there exists a β > 0 such that∫ 1
q+B+β
f(q)dq > ρ¯ we have
∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq −
∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq =
∫ 1
q+B
(2q − 1)f(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+B+β
(2q − 1)f(q)dq
≥ 2β
∫ 1
q+B+β
f(q)dq
> 2βρ¯.
Thus, most voters vote for the candidate that coincides with the state of nature as we wanted
to show.
Consider now the case where for all ρ > 0 there exists a N¯ such that
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq ≤ ρ for
all n > N¯ . By monotonicity of F and the fact that
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq → 0 we have q+R → q+B → 1.
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Moreover,
lim
q+B→1
σAQ
σQQ
= lim
q+B→1
∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
,
= lim
q+B→1
(1− q+B)f(q+B)
q+Bf(q
+
B)
,
= lim
q+B→1
1
q+B
− 1,
= 0,
and similarly limq+R→1
σQA
σAA
= 0, where we have used L’Hoˆpital’s rule for computing the limit
above. That is, the probability that a random voter votes for the candidate that does not
match the state of nature is insignificant compared to the probability that a random voter
votes for the candidate that does, which implies P (V = S)→ 1.
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B Appendix: Experimental Instructions
Welcome! You are about to participate in a decision making experiment. If you follow
the instructions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money depending on your
decisions and the decisions of the other participants. Your earnings will be paid to you in
cash at the end of the experiment
This set of instructions is for your private use only. During the experiment you are not
allowed to communicate with anybody. In case of questions, please raise your hand. Then
we will come to your seat and answer your questions. Any violation of this rule excludes you
immediately from the experiment and all payments.
For your participation you will receive a show-up fee 3 pounds. You can earn additional
amounts of money. Below we will describe how. All your decisions will be treated confiden-
tially both during the experiment and after the experiment. This means that none of the
other participants will know which decisions you made.
Experimental Instructions The experiment will last for 30 rounds. In each round you
will be matched randomly in groups of four participants. Remember that the groups change
in each round, so the participants you play with in one round are most likely different from
those you played with the round before. At the beginning of each round of the experiment
the computer randomly draws one of two colours RED or BLUE. We call the colour that was
drawn “the state”. BLUE is much more likely than RED to be drawn. In particular there
is a 95% chance that BLUE is drawn and only a 5% chance that RED is drawn. Remember
that the state is drawn anew in each round, i.e. it can be different in each round. The state
is the same, though, for all group members in each round.
Figure 7: The state is BLUE with a 95% chance, i.e. a chance of 95 in 100.
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Goal of the experiment: You will be asked to guess whether the state is RED or BLUE.
Your goal is to guess correctly as a group. Hence it will not matter whether you guess
correctly yourself. The only thing that matters is whether the majority of your group guesses
correctly. We will explain now what additional information each group member gets before
making a guess, what guesses you can make and how your payments are computed.
Information you receive: Each group member receives a “signal” about whether the
state is BLUE or RED before they submit their guess. A signal is a ball drawn randomly
from a box containing RED and BLUE balls. All balls in a box are equally likely to be drawn.
There are however, two boxes for each player and you don’t know which one the ball is
drawn from. If the state is BLUE the ball will be drawn from your BLUE box. (Remember
that this is the case with a 95% chance). If the state is RED, the ball will be drawn from
your RED box. (This is the case with a 5% chance). Hence if you knew the box you would
know the state. This is true for all participants.
There are always at least as many BLUE balls in your BLUE box as there are in your
RED box. Hence, if both boxes were equally likely, a BLUE ball is more likely to come from
a BLUE box and a RED ball is more likely to come from a RED box.
How much more likely will depend on the exact composition of the boxes. In each round
you will be shown the composition of your boxes. You will also be shown the colour of the
ball drawn.
It is important to note that the composition of boxes can be different for different group
members. In particular, for each participant, the number of BLUE balls in their BLUE box is
randomly drawn from anything between half the balls being BLUE to all balls being BLUE.
The number of RED balls in a participant’s RED box always equals the number of BLUE
balls in their BLUE box
Things to remember about signals:
• You will see a ball drawn from either your RED or your BLUE box.
• If the state is BLUE the ball will be drawn from the BLUE box. If the state is RED it
will be drawn from the RED box.
• You will also see how many RED and BLUE balls your RED and BLUE boxes contain.
• All other group members will also see a ball drawn from one of their boxes.
• Remember, though, that their boxes can have a different composition.
• Boxes change in each round for each participant.
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Making a guess: After all group members have received their signals, all will make a guess
simultaneously. You have three options. You either guess RED, BLUE or you can ABSTAIN.
Remember that the goal is to guess correctly as a group.
Your payment: Apart from the show up fee you receive, one round is drawn for payment
and you receive
• 10 additional pounds if the group guesses correctly in that round and
• 2 additional pounds if the group is not correct in that round.
When is the group correct? The group is correct if the majority of group members who
do not abstain indicate the correct state.
Hence, if the state is BLUE then the group is correct if
• at least 3 group members vote BLUE,
• at least 2 group members vote BLUE and at least one abstains,
• at least 1 group member votes BLUE and all others abstain.
Similarly, if the state is RED then the group is correct if
• at least 3 group members vote RED,
• at least 2 group members vote RED and at least one abstains,
• at least 1 group member votes RED and all others abstain.
If the same number of group members vote RED and BLUE, then there is a tie and
whether the group’s guess is considered correct is determined by the flip of a coin.
Control Questions: Are the following statements TRUE or FALSE? If you have any
questions please raise your hand.
1. My group members change from round to round.
2. All group members receive a ball from the same box.
3. The composition of the box of my group members can be different from the composition
of my box.
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4. If I vote RED, one group member abstains and two vote BLUE, I receive 2 pounds if
the state is RED and 10 pounds if the state is BLUE.
5. If I vote BLUE, one group member abstains and two vote BLUE, I receive 2 pounds if
the state is RED and 10 pounds if the state is BLUE.
6. Only one round is randomly drawn for payment.
ENJOY THE EXPERIMENT !!
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C Appendix: Additional Tables
This Appendix collects additional tables. Table 6 shows the distribution of votes with/against
the signal and abstentions depending on treatment and signal. In the asymmetric treatments
participants usually vote with their signal if it is BLUE. If their signal is RED, by contrast,
the modal action is to vote against the signal. There is a substantial share of abstentions as
well among voters with a RED signal.
SYM ASYM ASYM-COARSE
RED BLUE Overall RED BLUE Overall RED BLUE Overall
with signal 0.65 0.72 0.69 0.19 0.90 0.66 0.09 0.89 0.69
abstain 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.34 0.08 0.17 0.24 0.10 0.17
against signal 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.46 0.02 0.17 0.67 0.01 0.17
Table 6: Share of votes with/against the signal as well as abstentions depending on treatment
and signal.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Vote against signal if it is: RED BLUE RED 15-30 BLUE 15-30
q -0.0698 -0.243*** -0.149 -0.192**
(0.122) (0.0586) (0.147) (0.0864)
ASYM 0.434** -0.172*** 0.547*** -0.183**
(0.171) (0.0600) (0.200) (0.0846)
ASYM-COARSE 0.900*** -0.192** 0.688** -0.184*
(0.239) (0.0751) (0.290) (0.104)
ASYM × q -0.137 0.178** -0.267 0.153
(0.223) (0.0789) (0.261) (0.114)
ASYM-COARSE × q -0.619* 0.171 -0.191 0.138
(0.369) (0.112) (0.461) (0.155)
Constant 0.169 0.243*** 0.194 0.224***
(0.105) (0.0434) (0.125) (0.0619)
Observations 809 1,351 435 645
Groups 72 72 72 72
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Random Effects OLS regressions: Voting against one’s signal when it indicates the
low prior (column (1)) or high prior (column (2)) state. Columns (3) and (4) only consider
data from the last 15 periods.
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yit = αi + β0qit + β1ASYM+ β2ASYM-COARSE (11)
+ β10 ∗ (qit ∗ASYM) + β20 ∗ (qit ∗ASYM-COARSE) + it
Table 7 shows the results of running regression (11) in our sample using as binary outcome
yit whether or not a participant i abstained in period t. Columns (1) and (2) include the
whole sample, columns (3) and (4) only the second half of the experiment after potentially
some learning has occurred. Columns (1) and (3) focus on participants who received a RED
signal. The estimates show that in the baseline (treatment SYM) participants rarely vote
against their signal. They do so more often in ASYM and ASYM-COARSE if the signal
is RED, i.e. goes against the prior and less often if it is BLUE, i.e. consistent with the prior.
Signal accuracy decreases the propensity to vote against the signal across all treatments,
albeit not always significantly so.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Abstain if signal is RED BLUE RED 15-30 BLUE 15-30
q -1.171*** -1.148*** -1.258*** -1.174***
(0.125) (0.106) (0.169) (0.143)
ASYM -0.396** -0.527*** -0.610*** -0.697***
(0.173) (0.112) (0.223) (0.145)
ASYM-COARSE -1.065*** -0.731*** -1.004*** -0.890***
(0.242) (0.138) (0.328) (0.175)
ASYM × q 0.636*** 0.627*** 1.064*** 0.751***
(0.228) (0.142) (0.301) (0.188)
ASYM-COARSE × q 1.600*** 0.896*** 1.528*** 1.061***
(0.378) (0.201) (0.528) (0.257)
Constant 1.060*** 0.997*** 1.123*** 1.056***
(0.105) (0.0811) (0.138) (0.106)
Observations 809 1,351 435 645
Number of id 72 72 72 72
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Random Effects OLS regressions: Abstaining when the signal indicates the low prior
(column (1)) or high prior (column (2)) state. Columns (3) and (4) only consider data from
the last 15 periods.
Table 8 shows the results of running regression (11) in our sample using as binary outcome
yit whether or not a participant i abstained in period t. Irrespective of the signal, participants
abstain less often in ASYM and ASYM-COARSE compared to SYM. An increased
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signal accuracy increases the propensity to abstain in ASYM and ASYM-COARSE,
where participants decide to abstain rather than voting against the signal, but decreases it
in SYM, where participants decide to vote with the signal instead of abstaining.
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